Given the discussion surrounding the 2018 elections and whether or not they can be called a "blue wave" (with naysayers downplaying the results), and the constant rally cries of "This won't hurt him with his base!" every time Trump does or says something particularly stupid or nasty, I thought it was worth posting this and going through the basic tenants of his argument.
Trump's Base Isn't Enough
For one: Turnout was through the roof and once the votes are fully tallied, Democrats may have nearly matched (or just matched outright) Trump's popular vote total. This is highly unprecedented:
Nate then goes onto explain how Democrats did extremely well in the Midwest, with states like Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania (the three states that denied Clinton the victory in 2016), but also in states like Arizona and Texas that haven't really factored into the party's national strategy yet.
He notes that midterm elections aren't necessarily predictive of what will happen in the next presidential election (Nixon, Reagan, Clinton and Obama all handily won re-election despite their party losing big in the midterms). But even with Republican turnout being similarly high for a midterm, he spells out the danger for Trump and the GOP going forward:
Sort of as a follow-up to the point about previous presidents winning after a bad midterm, Nate points out the change in tactics each President pursued that helped them recover:
nb4 "but Trump's base!"
Trump's Base Isn't Enough
For one: Turnout was through the roof and once the votes are fully tallied, Democrats may have nearly matched (or just matched outright) Trump's popular vote total. This is highly unprecedented:
In another important respect, however, the 2018 wave was indisputably unlike any other in recent midterm history: It came with exceptionally high turnout. Turnout is currently estimated at 116 million voters, or 49.4 percent of the voting-eligible population. That's an astounding number; only 83 million people voted in 2014, by contrast.
This high turnout makes for some rather unusual accomplishments. For instance, Democratic candidates for the House will receive almost as many votes this year as the 63 million that President Trump received in 2016, when he won the Electoral College (but lost the popular vote).
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There isn't really any precedent for the opposition party at the midterm coming so close to the president's vote total. The closest thing to an exception is 1970, when Democratic candidates for the House got 92 percent of Richard Nixon's vote total from 1968, when he was elected president with only 43 percent of the vote. Even in wave elections, the opposition party usually comes nowhere near to replicating the president's vote from two years earlier. In 2010, for instance, Republican candidates received 44.8 million votes for the House — a then-record total for a midterm but far fewer than Barack Obama's 69.5 million votes in 2008.
Nate then goes onto explain how Democrats did extremely well in the Midwest, with states like Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania (the three states that denied Clinton the victory in 2016), but also in states like Arizona and Texas that haven't really factored into the party's national strategy yet.
He notes that midterm elections aren't necessarily predictive of what will happen in the next presidential election (Nixon, Reagan, Clinton and Obama all handily won re-election despite their party losing big in the midterms). But even with Republican turnout being similarly high for a midterm, he spells out the danger for Trump and the GOP going forward:
This year's results do serve as a warning to Trump in one important sense, however: His base alone will not be enough to win a second term. Throughout the stretch run of the 2018 midterm campaign, Trump and Republicans highlighted highly charged partisan issues, from the Central American migrant caravan to Brett Kavanaugh's confirmation to the Supreme Court. And Republican voters did indeed turn out in very high numbers: GOP candidates for the House received more than 50 million votes, more than the roughly 45 million they got in 2010.
But it wasn't enough, or even close to enough. Problem No. 1 is that Republicans lost among swing voters: Independent voters went for Democrats by a 12-point margin, and voters who voted for a third-party candidate in 2016 went to Democrats by 13 points.
Trump and Republicans also have Problem No. 2, however: Their base is smaller than the Democratic one. This isn't quite as much of a disadvantage as it might seem; the Democratic base is less cohesive and therefore harder to govern. Democratic voters are sometimes less likely to turn out, although that wasn't a problem this year. And because Republican voters are concentrated in rural, agrarian states, the GOP has a big advantage in the Senate.
Nonetheless, it does mean that Republicans can't win the presidency by turning out their base alone, a strategy that sometimes is available to Democrats. (Obama won re-election in 2012 despite losing independents by 5 points because his base was larger.) In the exit polling era, Republicans have never once had an advantage in party identification among voters in presidential years. George W. Bush's Republicans were able to fight Democrats to a draw in 2004, when party identification was even, but that was the exception rather than the rule.
Sort of as a follow-up to the point about previous presidents winning after a bad midterm, Nate points out the change in tactics each President pursued that helped them recover:
But presidents such as Reagan, Clinton and Obama, who recovered to win re-election after difficult midterms, didn't do it without making some adjustments. Both Reagan and Clinton took a more explicitly bipartisan approach after their midterm losses. Obama at least acknowledged the scope of his defeat, owning up to his "shellacking" after 2010, although an initially bipartisan tone in 2011 had given way to a more combative approach by 2012. All three presidents also benefited from recovering economies — and although the economy is very strong now, there is arguably more downside than upside for Trump (voters have high expectations, but growth is more likely than not to slow a bit).
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At the least, odds are that Trump needs a course-correction, and it's anyone's guess as to whether he'll be willing to take one. While there's some speculation that Trump could move in a more bipartisan direction, that hasn't really been apparent yet in his actions since the midterms, or at least not on a consistent basis. Instead, he's spent the first fortnight after the midterms firing his attorney general, implying that Democrats were trying to steal elections in Florida, and bragging about how he'd give himself an A-plus rating as president. The next two years will less be a test of Trump's willpower than one of his dexterity and even his humility — not qualities he's been known to have in great measure.
nb4 "but Trump's base!"