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Ethiopian Airlines: Boeing 737 crashes on way to Kenya (UP: No survivors)
- Thread starter MikeHattsu
- Start date
No additional sensors, they just added the AoA readout to the screen. There's a light that indicates bad data currently.
The 737-MAX was designed to fly transatlantic Norwegian air fly them from London to New York
Yikes at the co-pilot putting the nose straight up AGAIN and stalling the plane. They were good..and would have recovered even without auto-pilot if he had simply raised the nose enough to start gaining altitude.
Imaginary rule number 1 is "Don't point your plane straight up."
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Ohhhh ok. My apologies on that. Is that still a majorly helpful thing to potentially counteract these issues in the US?
It would identify the cause of the runaway trim but wouldn't really have an impact on how they deal with it as far as I know. You still follow the checklist to turn the system off. It's just additional info.
Yep, hence I said almost all :) British Airways also fly Airbus A318s from London to New York (via Shannon) using the old Concorde routes.
if mcas will still activate based on readings from a single alpha vane instead of both, that needs to be changed. it seems obvious and of course boeing engineers know 80 trillion times more than me but because it seems obvious I wonder why it's set up the way it is.
I'm flying to seoul in a month, I think it's an Airbus plane. Hoping it is :/
It means the information they have now suggests no aircraft are in danger.
Uh I have several flights coming up. How can you tell if you are on one of these planes on Southwest? I cannot find anything that shows what type of plane it actually is.
search the flight number in google and a million other sites will tell you
I'm really glad they took this decision. I was going to fly with them to Miami on a 737 Max. They're saying they will use a 737 NG as a substitute, which will probably mean more stops, but I'm fine with this. Such a relief.
This happens at nearly every single airplane crash. Someone always sees a burning plane.
RIP to all of the victims
This is truly horrifying as fuck.... Now I am even scared to travel after hearing this... :(
This is truly horrifying as fuck.... Now I am even scared to travel after hearing this... :(
The plane has two pitot tubes that reads the aoa, one for each pilot. In the JT602 incident there was aoa disagreement between the tubes but according the MEL records it was replaced before the tragic flight.
As usual most airplane crashes are due to many errors lining up, like holes in a swiss cheese.
I think I read somewhere that only a single reading is required to trigger mcas though. Shouldn't it ideally require both (and not activate if there's a disagreement?)
CVR will shed a lot of light on any technical issues the pilots were experiencing, but it's not looking good for Boeing, particularly if witnesses are implying very similar flight patterns and descent. Software issues interfering with pilot training on the 737 MAX's is inexcusable and if this is the cause Boeing rightfully deserve to be dragged through glass.
While a vast majority of 737 MAX's seem to be safely operating, a five month window of the exact same aircraft potentially crashing the exact same way for the exact same technical issues is extremely high risk and they should be grounded until the specific problem can be identified.
While a vast majority of 737 MAX's seem to be safely operating, a five month window of the exact same aircraft potentially crashing the exact same way for the exact same technical issues is extremely high risk and they should be grounded until the specific problem can be identified.
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If American's checklist was still wrong I doubt Lion Air's was correct. Especially given the pilot's last action...that would have worked on the previous model.
The lion air crash actually wasn't a technical issue (aside from the sensors not being fixed between flights) but an issue with the pilots not performing the correct checklist procedure. The same aircraft had the same problem earlier that day and the standard Boeing runaway trim checklist fixed the issue and it completed its flight just fine.
If this accident is due to the same thing, it's simply the pilots not doing the checklist. Whether it was faulty sensors to the MCAS or some other issue causing the runaway trim the procedure that's been around for decades would have fixed it.
The next step in the checklist is to throw the cutout switch. It's always been there.
So this billion dollar company that wanted to save money on pilot training and simulator's defense is that they should follow the checklist but actually the checklist is wrong and so is your previously learned method even though the planes are supposed to be the same and they should go to the next step in the checklist while the plane repeatedly tries to nose dive itself due to a undisclosed system.
The checklist isn't wrong. Checklists work that way - you try each until the problem is fixed. Turning the systems off is the next step and has been forever. It's not new.
What's also been around is pulling back on control overrides uncommanded trim, which is the last step they tried, which is a step on a checklist, which is a step that doesn't even work anymore therefore the checklist is wrong.
So why are there additional steps to try after that if that doesn't work? You're not understanding the function of the checklist.
From the NYT comment section:
"From an engineering point of view it seems to me that the bean counters have prevailed over the real engineers at Boeing.
They kept on evolving a 1967 aircraft design for over 50 years, presumably to avoid the massive costs of a complete redesign, testing and certification.
The MAX 8 has pushed the 737 envelope so far that they had to mount the new, larger engines further out on the wings, otherwise they'd touch ground. However, moving the engines further out created a potential aerodynamic instability that could lead the aircraft into a stall.
Rather than redesigning the wings (and incurring all the costs) they decided to use a very invasive software to automatically correct a detected stall.
Then to save even more money they decided that this software would rely on the data from two sensors (instead of three) to determine the pitch of the aircraft - thus making it impossible to determine a safe pitch in case of sensor failure.
Then, to squeeze even the last dollars out of their budget, they decided not to include all these new software functions in the manuals, which would have required additional pilot training, and so on.
In summary, it seems to me that the MAX 8 is the result of the worst kind of "cost-saving engineering" that I would not accept out of a cheap plastic toy, let alone on a sophisticated aircraft that's supposed to carry millions of people safely around the world. Shame on Boeing. Their CEO and CFO should be sacked.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/boeing-737-max-air-crash-ethiopia.html
"From an engineering point of view it seems to me that the bean counters have prevailed over the real engineers at Boeing.
They kept on evolving a 1967 aircraft design for over 50 years, presumably to avoid the massive costs of a complete redesign, testing and certification.
The MAX 8 has pushed the 737 envelope so far that they had to mount the new, larger engines further out on the wings, otherwise they'd touch ground. However, moving the engines further out created a potential aerodynamic instability that could lead the aircraft into a stall.
Rather than redesigning the wings (and incurring all the costs) they decided to use a very invasive software to automatically correct a detected stall.
Then to save even more money they decided that this software would rely on the data from two sensors (instead of three) to determine the pitch of the aircraft - thus making it impossible to determine a safe pitch in case of sensor failure.
Then, to squeeze even the last dollars out of their budget, they decided not to include all these new software functions in the manuals, which would have required additional pilot training, and so on.
In summary, it seems to me that the MAX 8 is the result of the worst kind of "cost-saving engineering" that I would not accept out of a cheap plastic toy, let alone on a sophisticated aircraft that's supposed to carry millions of people safely around the world. Shame on Boeing. Their CEO and CFO should be sacked.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/boeing-737-max-air-crash-ethiopia.html
The issue wasn't potential instability, but stick force (the pressure the pilot has to use to move the stick) was just outside of what the regulatory agencies considers acceptable. So MCAS adds a little trim to make it easier to control.
The impact isn't really "very" invasive - the system trims nose down at half its normal speed over the course of 10 seconds, every 5 seconds. This moves these big trim wheels that make a shit load of noise so no one is failing to notice. If the trim is running away - which is something all pilots train for - they grab the checklist and turn off the autopilot, if that doesn't work they hit the cutout switches then lastly just grab the wheel and physically stop it if all else fails. This, again, has been the procedure in the 737 for decades and decades and would have completely fixed the issue with the Lion Air crash (and did the flight before in the same aircraft!) and presumably with this flight if the reason for the crash is the same.
Not to mention fixing the sensor issue would have prevented the whole thing in the Lion Air crash. It's too early in this case to know if something like that occurred but maintenance usually plays some kind of factor when sensors fail.
The impact isn't really "very" invasive - the system trims nose down at half its normal speed over the course of 10 seconds, every 5 seconds. This moves these big trim wheels that make a shit load of noise so no one is failing to notice. If the trim is running away - which is something all pilots train for - they grab the checklist and turn off the autopilot, if that doesn't work they hit the cutout switches then lastly just grab the wheel and physically stop it if all else fails. This, again, has been the procedure in the 737 for decades and decades and would have completely fixed the issue with the Lion Air crash (and did the flight before in the same aircraft!) and presumably with this flight if the reason for the crash is the same.
Not to mention fixing the sensor issue would have prevented the whole thing in the Lion Air crash. It's too early in this case to know if something like that occurred but maintenance usually plays some kind of factor when sensors fail.
I just learned a girl I knew in my highschool was one of the victims of this crash. I didn't know her too much but the times I talked with her and learning what she did after highschool and why she was there in the first place, it's really heartbreaking to learn about it. She was friends with a ton of my friends as well.
It's really sad to hear and I hope her family and friends get through this.
It's really sad to hear and I hope her family and friends get through this.
The former; avionics design specifically.
I'd recommend just doing a search on various commercial aviation forums and even youtube where you can watch training videos of runaway stabilizer procedures if you want to know more.
Here's the Boeing bulletin with info about the system and what checklist to follow specifically. Here's a training video showing how the trim wheels work and what to do in a runaway situation. At 5:10 he reads off the exact checklist right from the book that is always in the cockpit for exactly this situation.
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Thanks! So if these really are one off situations, what should the industry do to win back over its always (irrationally) fearful travelers? I'll be honest, I always tow the "flying as an irrational fear" trope, but this time the coincidence is unsettling and only further alarms already frightened travelers. I have a flight next month and my fiancé requested I confirm it's an older 737-800 model for her peace of mind.
So in my opinion, it's going to take some honest open communication to get all of our collective feathers un-ruffled. Not just a hand waving and pointing to policy and procedures.... I mean it's an option but one with poor optics to the average fearful traveler.
Oh yeah... From the Max's Wikipedia article, they specifically designed the 737 Max 8 to compete with something similar from Airbus.
Always amusing reading the opinions of all the armchair aerospace engineers in these threads. My condolences to the families of the deceased.
The airlines grounding the plane and the FAA issuing the continued airworthiness bulletin are part of the effort to assure passengers it's being taken seriously. That response is definitely a little disconnected from the actual technical aspect of finding what's wrong, since if you (as an airline) are explaining trim wheels and checklists you're probably not easing people's fears so much. When it comes to assigning responsibility it's important the correct things are looked at though since a feel good response might not make the changes actually needed to protect people.
What further complicates things is unions don't want the problem to be pilot error, manufacturers don't want the problem to be manufacturers, and the airlines don't want the problem to be the airline's. So the pilot's union blames Boeing or maintenance, Boeing blames the airline and the airline blames Boeing. That's why it's best to stick with what the regulatory authorities and other investigating agencies report and leave the PR to representatives of all the involved organizations.
why are people taking a comment on the NYT so seriously? It's all conjecture that it was suits and cost-saving and not clever engineering and using the power of computer and computer modeling.
the vast majority of the 737 MAXs are still flying today because the airlines and pilots involved believe the aircraft to be safe.
Just keep in mind even if there is an issue. Just look up the DC-10 (Cargo door) -- it got fixed, the planes kept flying.
the vast majority of the 737 MAXs are still flying today because the airlines and pilots involved believe the aircraft to be safe.
Just keep in mind even if there is an issue. Just look up the DC-10 (Cargo door) -- it got fixed, the planes kept flying.
Well personally speaking, as a person with a QA/BA background, currently working for a large multinational corporation, I have seen first hand how often quality is comprised for the sake of meeting and completing an irresponsibly understaffed/underbudgeted project timeline. And I'm also quite aware of how limited the scope of testing in general often is. Now I assume the engineers are top notch professionals at Boeing, but you know how things are.... I would not be shocked to find some things are not always up to par, quality control wise.
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As a developer wouldn't you agree that a system that can cause a plane to repeatedly nose dive due to a single point of failure is pretty bad?
I would expect something like this to take input from at least 3 sensors.